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of state and federal courts, removal of causes, venue, the new rules,
extraordinary remedies, special proceedings, trial practice, declaratory
judgments, judgments, new trials, appellate procedure, and federal
criminal procedure. With this wide field to cultivate, it will not be
strange if some of the germinating corn has been passed unnoticed. No
doubt the author felt that something should be left for the instructor
using the text, as there are many problems, still unsolved by the courts,
which when posed to the student will give rise to stimulating class
discussion.
This well indexed book is the best that we have seen for the purpose
for which it is intended. JAMES I. BOULGER
Member of Columbus Bar
THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF. By Lon L. Fuller. The Foun-
dation Press, Inc. 1940 JURISPRUDENCE. By Edgar
Bodenheimer. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1940.
Writing in 1887 Hastie quotes from Maine' (1861) to describe
the "widespread dissatisfaction with existing theories of jurisprudence"
which existed in England in both their times. For Hastie the evils were
an Austinian positivism and "the Utilitarian Principle." The former
was "unfruitful in scientific result," and the latter was not "capable of
longer satisfying the popular mind with its deepening Consciousness of
Right." Today, as evidenced by the two books under review, positivism
is again under attack, and the return urged, while not to the metaphysics
of Kant, is at least to the rule of reason of natural law.2 Thus American
jurisprudence traverses a cycle which began with a philosophy of natural
law, discovered the volkgeist of Savigny, applied the positivism of Austin,
developed the utilitarianism of Bentham and the pragmatism of James,
only again to seek a "Consciousness of Right" in the methods of
natural law.
It is against the extremes of positivism that the present reaction is
most usually directed. Whether the nadir or the zenith of jurispru-
dential theory was voiced by Holmes when he wished the divorcement
of all words of moral significance from the law,' at least he fathered a
thought which in the name of Neo-Realism today seeks a temporary
'Translator's Preface to KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LAv, p. xxv, quoting from
MAINE'S ANCIENT LAW.
2 For instance: HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS; HARVEY, JEAN
JACCUES BURLAMAQUE; OBERING, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSONi LEBUFFE AND
HAYES, JURISPRUDENCE; SCOTT, LAw, THE STATE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
'HOLMEs, The Path of the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, pg. 179 (I9zO).
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separation of the Is from the Ought. Sociological jurisprudence, too, is
positive, but it asks no such temporary severance. It not only recognizes
that law is normative, but seeks the content of norms in the "tradition-
ally received ideals of the social order."4 Theories of pragmatism and
of relative as distinguished from positive values, which spread so rapidly
after World War One, offered a fertile ground in which both Socio-
logical jurisprudence and Neo-Realism could flourish. But Realism
went beyond Sociological jurisprudence, and in the name of scientific
method sought empirically to evaluate law in terms of judicial behavior.
For this purpose its insistence on a temporary separation of what is
from what ought to be in law has earned for it the accusation, whether
rightly or wrongly,' of being unmoral jurisprudence. But today values,
both in and out of law, are being challenged generally. Hence the
revival of a jurisprudence which purports to devote more thought to
what ought to be seems inevitable.
Professor Fuller's book consists of three lectures which were given
at the Law School of Northwestern University in April 1940 under
the Julius Rosenthal Foundation for General Law. His subject is nat-
ural law versus positivism. "Natural law . . . is the view which denies
the possibility of a rigid separation of the is from the ought, and which
tolerates a confusion of them in legal discussion." Legal positivism is
"that direction of legal thought which insists on drawing a sharp distinc-
tion between the two" (p. 5). The lectures trace the course of posi-
tivism from Hobbes through Kelsen and the American Neo-Realists.
"They (positivists) insist that their primary object is to promote clear
thinking in the law" (p. 85). But, according to Professor Fuller, "the
purely formal and verbal nature of the conclusions of legal positivism
is revealed in the inability of positivism, in all its forms to deal with the
content of the law. Not only has positivism failed in its quest for some
definite criterion of the law that is, but it has failed to say anything
significant concerning the law which it assumes to 'be.' Even within
the framework of its own premises it remains formal and sterile" (pp.
88 and 89). Thus "American legal scholarship suffers at present from
the inhibitive effect of a positivistic philosophy" (p. 128). "The con-
ception which finds the justification for democracy in skepticism is not
only demonstrably incapable of sustaining a nation in time of crisis, but
it has also, . . .accelerated the disintegrative forces which threaten
modern society" (p. 125).
POUND, Common Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, vol. 4 at pg. 51
(,93).
'See McDouGAL, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 5o YALE
L. J. 827 (1941).
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But to the author the rejection of positivism does not "imply a
recommendation that we go the whole way in the opposite direction of
legal thought" (p. 99). He is not sponsoring "any of the various
systems of natural law which have been advocated in the past" (p. IoI),
nor "the doctrine of natural rights" (p. ioo). It is the "broader and
freer legal method" (p. 103) of the old books which he advocates. In
a double sense this is "natural law." "In the first place, it is the method
men naturally follow when they are not consciously or unconsciously
inhibited by a positivistic philosophy. . . . In the second place, when
reason is uninhibited by positivistic restraints, it tends inevitably to find
anchorage in the natural laws which are assumed to underlie the rela-
tions of men and to determine the growth and decay of civilizations"
(pp. 103 and 104).
Whether or not Professor Fuller has proved his thesis is one thing.
That he has stated a problem of values in legal norms is certain. But
to the reviewer this statement does not require the rejection of positivism.
It simply challenges rationalism to supply a deficiency in modern juris-
prudence. A descriptive science of Is law can exist along with a norma-
tive science of Ought law. Professor Yntema has pointed this out.6
Somewhat similar in objectives to Professor Fullers lectures is
Professor Bodenheimer's text on Jurisprudence. He, too, is interested
in law's content, and in apprehensive of positivism. He believes that
"The modern attack against reason is at the same time an attack against
law. Law is primarily a rational institution." It "incorporates certain
values which are very largely coextensive with the values of human
civilization as such." The positivistic epoch in jurisprudence took the
law for granted and looked only to its form." But "when we look at
the form of the law merely, we shall not be able to detect the essential
difference between the power state and the law state." "The challenge
to which the law is subjected in our time makes it imperative to reex-
amine the basic nature and character of this institution" (p. vii). In his
investigation, then, "He has attempted to emphasize above all those
issues which have some relation to the great political and social struggles
going on in the world today. Among those issues the contrast between
arbitrary power and law, between totalitarianism and constitutionalism,
has received particular attention and has been made the starting point
of the discussion" (p. ix). His method is to describe in their purest and
most advanced forms those institutions which he admires and also those
which he criticises (sec. 60). His assumption is "that legal sociology
can maintain its place among the social sciences only if it combines . .
'YN rEMA, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COL. L.R., 929 (193I).
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the function of picturing the mature type of law and the task of
analyzing the cause of legal evolution, as far as it is feasible" (p. 324).
His conclusion is that "only a merger of the methods used by the
natural-law jurists with the methods employed by modern sociologists
can bring about that rebirth of jurisprudence which seems so necessary
in a time which questions the very foundations of the law" (p. 324).
Part I, then, discusses "Power and Law." "Law arises from the
tensions and adjustments between society and its rulers" (p. 212). It
"is a mean between anarchy and despotism" (p. 19). "Sovereignty"
and the "state," however, are still useful concepts (p. 70). But the
state should be a law state and not a power state. Hence the task is to
circumscribe the exercise of power by the state. This may be accom-
plished by a constitution and by some system of checks and balances
(pp. 25 and 26). Also, individuals as well as states may abuse power.
"Law in its purest and most perfect form will be realized in a social
order in which the possibility of abuse of power by private individuals
as well as by the government is reduced to a minimum" (p. 19). Hence
"it is the function of private law to grant, define, and circumscribe the
sphere of power which private individuals are to enjoy" (p. i9). This
sphere should be neither too wide nor too small (p. 22). In its pure
form law "is a relation between equals, not between a superior and an
inferior" (p. 21). "From the point of view of pure law, it would
almost seem logical to demand an absolute social and economic equality
of all men" (p. 27). But in point of fact law, "namely a law which
will have eliminated all traces of power relation between men, could
never be a permanent condition" (p. 28).
The state administers law, but leaves morals and customs largely to
other controls (p. 73). Also there is the matter of administration, which
"is the regulation of private or public affairs according to the principle
of expediency (p. 87). In its essence administration "is an exercise of
power" (p. 91). "Public administration, in particular, is a sphere of
free activity by the government. The guiding directive of public admin-
istration is the principle of expediency and the will to achieve certain
practical results through the application of the most efficient means"
(p. 91). "Law and administration are different not only in their con-
cept, but also in their operation and effect" (p. 95)- "Law is mainly
concerned with rights; administration is mainly concerned with results.
Law is conducive to liberty and security, while administration promotes
efficiency and quick decision. The dangers of law are rigidity and stag-
nation; the dangers of administration are bureaucracy and autocracy"
(P- 95). Hence, although "an increase in administrative control was
inevitable and necessary in the United States in order to achieve effi-
ciency" (p. 97), its exercises should be carefully surrounded by legal
safeguards. "The equal treatment of equal situations is the most funda-
mental requirement of justice" (p. 98).
This distinction between law and administration is orthodox enough.
But it would seem that Professor Bodenheimer's fear of bureaucracy
and of power control has led him here into a formal and needless
distinction, which excludes from the concept of law a large body of
growing precedent which is being established by administrative tri-
bunals." Perhaps in view of authority it is too much to ask Professor
Bodenheimer that in the name of reason he disregard form and consider
substance. Yet such seems to be his own thesis. It is unfortunate that
his method of describing institutions by their advanced forms and his
fears of evil consequences potential in such forms, at times distort his
evaluations.
Parts II and III are freest from this fault. In Part II the author
deals with the Law of Nature, tracing its various schools in a succinct,
informative and readable style. Part III treats a selected group of
Law-Shaping Forces: political, psychological, economic, national and
racial, and cultural determinism.' Any student and any lawyer will
profit by these descriptions.
Part IV concerns positivism: both analytical and sociological, includ-
ing with the former a discussion of Bentham and of Jhering. And
again predilections becloud the author's appraisals. Thus Kelsen's view
"deprives the concept of law of all meaning" 9 (p. 290). So also in
discussing Pound's replacement of "rationalism in legal science by
empiricism and pragmatism" (p. 30) and his "science of social engi-
neering" (p. 307), it would be well for the author to remember that
the science of law neither now nor in the past has awaited the time
when philosophers could agree upon what its content should be."0
The reviewer agrees with much of the underlying assumption of
both Professor Fuller and Professor Bodenheimer: an appraisal of law
values is necessary if faith in democracy's law is not only to be felt but
to be stated. Further, this would seem to be the task of rationalism.
Empirical standards of utility, of pragmatism and of cultural deter-
minism have served their purposes in directing courts to the ends of
law. But something more is needed if "received ideals of the social
'See FREUND, Administrative Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, VOl. I
at pg. 454. and 455.
' For criticism see Simpson, Book Review, 54 HARVARD L.R. IoUS, zo9o (5945).
9 And see FULLER, pp. 77, 88, 89, 114-
'9POUND, Jurisprudence, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, vol. 8, p. 485-
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order"" are to articulate the spiritual requirement of the present.
Nor is the problem as simple as when Locke stated our faith and
Montesquieu our ideal of government, to combine the spirit and the
framework of democracy. Modern iconoclasm and pessimism will not
suffice. There is a call for a restatement of values. Professor Fuller's
lectures and Professor Bodenheimer's text should indeed be recom-
mended reading for student and for lawyer alike. But in the end the
cause of a normative science of law is not advanced by a denunciation






ORGANIZATION OF CouRTs. By Roscoe Pound. Little, Brown
& Co., Boston, Mlass. 1940.
For several reasons Organization of Courts published under the
auspices of the National Conference of Judicial Councils, is a volume
that should be read by every member of the legal profession and by
many laymen.
In the first place the author is Honorable Roscoe Pound, Dean
Emeritus of the Harvard School of Law, who, in addition to his
extended career as a law teacher and writer, acquired valuable experi-
ence as a member of the Supreme Court Commission of his native
state of Nebraska.
Secondly, in these critical days accurate information with reference
to the judicial branch of the government is of great general value. It
is undoubtedly accurate to say that most citizens possess a fairly definite
concept of the simpler functions of the legislative and executive branches
of our government. While it is of course true that during the last four
or five years popular attention has been attracted to the courts by
reason of the unusual number of momentous decisions announced,
nevertheless to many citizens their courts remain mysterious and for-
bidding institutions; and the higher the court, the more general seems
to be the prevalence of this unfortunate illusion.
In the third place Dean Pound has assembled valuable and inter-
' POUND, Common Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScIENCES, vol. 4 at pg. Sx.
Supra note No. 4.
